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This paper does not intend to summarize all the achievements and problems of the 
Bangladesh economy or the economic challenges facing us in the future. I presume 
readers will be well-informed of the contours of our economic development and the 
challenges we face. Instead, I wish to argue that we need to think both radically and 
pragmatically to identify the critical strategies and policies that can help take 
Bangladesh into the ranks of middle income countries, and indeed to transform the 
country into a self-confident regional player enjoying broad-based development. The 
challenges we face have common features with other developing countries. We need 
to learn from the experience of other countries as well as our own experiences with 
growth and development. In particular, I want to argue that finding sustainable 
solutions in developing countries often requires identifying a small number of 
potentially implementable institutions and developing agencies that are most likely to 
make an impact given our understanding of the political economy constraining the 
development process. Reform efforts are most likely to work if they focus on a small 
number of areas and if the political leadership focuses on building a national 
consensus supporting the importance of building the institutional and political 
capabilities for addressing a small number of core developmental issues. The 
analytical challenge is to identify the implementable solutions that may make an 
impact on the potentially significant problems that a developing country like 
Bangladesh faces. In this paper I suggest as examples a number of areas where the 
development of institutions and institutional capacity is vital and could make a 
significant difference to development outcomes. These areas are not necessarily 
exhaustive but give an idea of the type of thinking we need to engage in based on 
international experiences.  
 
The importance of building institutions and achieving a national consensus supporting 
important institutions is of course well recognized. But the dominant international 
policy discourse has identified a governance agenda for developing countries that is 
actually not appropriate and which has proved very difficult to implement to any 
significant degree. The well-known dominant discourse within the economics 
discipline and global policy institutions suggests that developing countries should 
focus on building a set of ‘good governance’ institutions and policies that can in 
theory make markets more efficient. Indeed, the entire ‘good governance’ and 
liberalization agenda is underpinned by an economic and institutional theory that 
suggests that these reforms (if they can be effectively implemented) would achieve 
efficient market economies. This Western discourse and its salience in our own policy 
circles are well known. There is a powerful body of policy-makers who argue that we 
can ensure long-term development by focusing on institutionalizing market 
liberalization and building institutions of good governance that will in turn create an 
good ‘investment climate’ for investors. While these ideas are based on plausible 
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economic theories, the global evidence of successful development and even the 
evidence from Bangladesh suggest that many of these good ideas are not 
implementable in poor countries to an extent that can make a significant difference in 
the short to medium term. The poor countries that did develop dramatically in the last 
century did not do so by first implementing the reform package suggested for them, 
but by building effective policies and governance capabilities that addressed particular 
problems that were constraining their development. When we look at this historical 
experience more closely, we find that a rather different focus for policy and politics is 
required for sustaining growth and development. The political challenge is to discuss 
and agree on feasible and effective policy based on the best available economic 
evidence from countries that have actually succeeded. A parallel and equally 
necessary challenge is to construct the political constituencies supporting such a 
programme.  
 
The next section briefly summarizes the broad economic challenges, which are widely 
recognized and not controversial. I cannot attempt to deal with all these areas so I will 
instead pick on a number of vital areas that I believe pose constraints for sustaining 
development. In each of these areas, the achievement of good governance and 
efficient markets could in theory provide solutions. But in reality, good governance 
reforms are not substantially implementable in developing countries and therefore 
when we look at the experience of successful countries we always find that very 
specific, pragmatic and sometimes accidental solutions have addressed important 
problems that needed to be resolved. Our challenge is to learn from these experiences, 
both those of other countries and our own, so that we can identify a small number of 
implementable institutions and capabilities that are most likely to make an impact. I 
look briefly at three important constraints that are important to overcome for 
sustaining development based on our own experiences and those of other countries. 
The first is the challenge of creating new productive capabilities rapidly so as to 
diversify and extend the productive sector. The second is to devise feasible 
institutional and political solutions to address the issue of land use and natural 
resource extraction. And finally, there is the issue of power generation. But first, I 
begin by briefly summarizing the range of developmental challenges in Bangladesh, 
though I presume these are well known to readers. I then outline why the conventional 
policy responses based on market-promoting ‘good governance’ strategies are 
insufficient for addressing these problems. Finally, I discuss the types of strategies 
and governance priorities that are required for addressing a range of important 
problems in the future.  
 
1. Summary of Economic Challenges  
There is broad agreement about the main challenges facing the economy of 
Bangladesh. Nevertheless, it is useful to summarize some of the issues before we 
begin to discuss the adequacy of existing policy responses. If we read the policy 
papers produced by a range of agencies and think tanks within Bangladesh and 
beyond, it is clear that most economists and policy-makers agree on the main contours 
of the challenges facing us. The policy question is really what should we be doing 
about it, what types of policies are feasible, and what types of governance and 
institutions are required to make these policies implementable? There is also a 
question of prioritizing problems and setting a national agenda for development. The 
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list of challenges is potentially long, but a number of areas stick out in terms of their 
salience and immediacy.  
 
Industry  
The key features of our economic growth over the last decade are summarized in 
Appendix Table 1. Clearly, over the long run, industry and manufacturing have been 
the fastest growing sectors in the Bangladesh economy, and this accounts both for the 
growing share of GDP coming from industry and manufacturing and the growing 
share of total employment accounted for by these sectors2
 
. In recent years the share of 
our GDP coming from industry has climbed to close to thirty per cent and 
manufacturing alone accounts for almost twenty per cent. Around fifteen per cent of 
the workforce is employed in industry. Industry and manufacturing are likely to 
remain drivers of growth into the future and it is desirable that they should. This is 
because the best way of providing large scale new employment to our growing 
workforce and thereby effectively reducing poverty is through the creation of 
employment in labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. Sustaining growth in 
manufacturing requires overcoming a number of constraints. Some of these 
constraints are quite extensively discussed in the existing policy literature even if 
adequate answers have yet to be found: like improving the availability of power and 
the quality of infrastructure. But other important constraints are not even adequately 
identified. These include the missing institutions and incentives required to build new 
productive capabilities in manufacturing so that new sectors can be opened up and 
existing production can move up the value chain.  
Our manufacturing sector has done very well in the last three decades, but it is 
dominated by a single sub-sector, garments and textiles. The dramatic growth of this 
sector since the 1980s has been a source of pride for the country. The sector clearly 
has significant further potential, but a mono-focus economy is vulnerable as we 
discovered when our focus was on the jute industry and we began to lose global 
markets in the 1970s. The recent demands for better wages and conditions in the 
garment industry also show that to sustain our share of world markets in this sector, 
productivity has to improve and the industry has to move up the value chain. The 
international experience shows that there are a series of related problems that 
countries face when they try to open up new manufacturing sectors, raise productivity 
or move up the value chain. Of these, the most challenging is the problem of creating 
new productive capabilities in new sectors and technologies. This requires new ways 
of sharing risk and financing the adoption and learning of new technologies, and 
appropriate governance structures to ensure that the learning is successful. We will 
return to this challenge later.  
 
Agriculture 
Although the majority of our population still resides in rural areas, the share of the 
workforce actually employed in agriculture has fallen to below fifty per cent (see 
Appendix Table 1). Relatively low growth in agriculture compared to other sectors 
means that the share of agriculture in our GDP has steadily fallen to under twenty per 
cent and is set to fall further. Given the characteristics of our ecology, the problems of 
river waters coming from India and the highly fragmented landholding structure that 
precludes significant investments, it is unlikely that agriculture will play a leading 
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role in driving growth or employment generation in the next fifty years. However, it is 
imperative that agriculture grows sufficiently to maintain food security in a world 
where food prices are likely to trend upwards in the next fifty years. It is also 
important for agriculture to sustain its growth and retain people in agricultural 
employment while more attractive options in other sectors are being developed. 
Fortunately, food output has been growing but there are significant challenges in 
sustaining this growth rate into the future. If manufacturing growth can be accelerated 
and people absorbed from agriculture into more attractive employment, the declining 
pressure on the land should allow land consolidation in pockets. This would make 
investment and mechanization easier and allow the growth of a more commercial 
agriculture. It is important to remember that the dominant agricultural exporting 
countries in the world typically have a tiny fraction of their workforce in agriculture. 
After a point, agricultural growth is paradoxically driven by people moving out of 
agriculture, and modern large scale farming will require significant land consolidation 
given the extreme fragmentation of landholdings in Bangladesh. These are longer 
term challenges for Bangladesh, and these processes will only become viable once 
significant job opportunities in manufacturing and high-valued services emerge. 
 
The Service Sector  
The service sector is the second fastest growing sector in Bangladesh: its share in 
GDP is around fifty per cent and growing. Almost forty per cent of the workforce is 
employed here. The service sector is particularly diverse, ranging from a modern 
high-value end consisting of financial services, trade, healthcare and education to a 
vast bottom end consisting of informal activities of all kinds including street hawkers, 
domestic servants and rickshaw pullers. A large part of the workforce employed in the 
service sector are engaged in low value activities and in this sense the service sector 
acts as a sink to absorb people in some employment when they cannot find 
employment elsewhere. This is the main reason why the service sector is so large in 
developing countries, particularly in developing countries where manufacturing is not 
growing rapidly enough to absorb all the people entering the job market at the bottom 
end of skills and education. The challenge in the service sector is to accelerate the 
growth of high-value service activities, and at the other end, to absorb people from 
low-value service activities into relatively better paying manufacturing jobs. The 
challenges at both ends are therefore quite closely related to the challenge of 
capability development. The health and education sectors, as high quality service 
sector activities can play a role in developing capabilities. The gaps in our education 
system in producing skills that are marketable are well known. But I will argue that 
while formal education is important it does not necessarily solve the problem of 
capability development required for setting up new sectors and moving up the value 
chain. I will argue later that on-the-job training and learning-by-doing within 
enterprises is vital for developing competitiveness in new sectors (Khan 2009b). In 
the absence of strategies for ensuring this, formally trained people coming out of the 
education system will fail to find jobs and their only recourse will be to migrate. 
 
Power and Infrastructure  
Power and infrastructure provision are a subset of industrial activities, but poor 
performance in these particular activities have resulted in their emergence as 
significant constraints for the whole economy. The poor supply of power and 
infrastructure has clearly affected growth in other sectors, as well as imposing 
hardships on citizens as direct consumers. At a deeper level, the power crisis is also 
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related to the slow progress in developing a gas and coal extraction policy that is 
broadly acceptable to important political constituencies. Exploration, power 
generation and infrastructure raise special problems because of the significantly 
greater chunks of capital required to develop solutions in these areas. Extracting 
natural resources results in a concentration of incomes in the hands of the companies 
who get the contracts and political acceptability requires states to have significant 
capabilities to tax and use these incomes to provide public goods. Our political and 
administrative system has not been particularly effective in addressing this problem or 
in dealing with the problems of rent seeking that affect sectors where significant 
public financing or purchasing is involved, or where significant natural resource rents 
are located.  
 
Bottlenecks in other public infrastructure systems like roads, ports, bridges and so on 
are regularly identified as constraints by investors. As all infrastructure problems 
cannot be simultaneously addressed by a developing country, policy-makers have to 
prioritize and seek political legitimacy for their prioritization through public debate 
and consensus-building. In addition, specific policy and governance solutions need to 
be devised to address these priorities. These are problems that most developing 
countries face, but in our case the problem is serious enough to have significantly 
slowed down the expansion of supply, particularly in power generation. Waiting for 
‘good governance’ reforms to improve accountability and transparency to address 
these problems is unlikely to be an adequate solution. Specific institutional and 
governance solutions are required that can directly address some of these challenges. 
 
Land Policy  
The fragmentation of land and overlapping systems of property rights has made land 
acquisition for productive purposes an arduous and difficult process. This is a 
standard problem across all developing countries and not by any means restricted to 
Bangladesh (Khan 2009a). Any significant investor requiring land for new productive 
enterprises has to invest a significant amount of time in locating contiguous pieces of 
land and then acquiring them from sellers whose own rights are often contested. 
Similar issues are faced by land acquisition strategies for natural resource extraction, 
in particular coal in the case of Bangladesh. Land acquisition by entrepreneurs often 
requires them to use mastans as ‘primitive accumulators’ who can use political and 
administrative power to overcome the problems that land acquisition faces. We know 
from the experience of neighbouring West Bengal that if the government does not 
have a strong and fair policy on land acquisition both the government and economic 
development can eventually face collapse. Here too, waiting for ‘good governance’ to 
sort out these problems by first creating clear property rights and then a good rule of 
law is not likely to be a good solution. Once again, specific developmental priorities 
and policies are required to make land available for accelerated development while a 
full sorting out of a rule of law and property rights will take a very long time. This can 
be partially addressed through policies like those setting up industrial zones. But the 
scale of the challenge implies that more specific policies are required that will work 
outside designated zones, and the zones themselves are proving to be quite difficult to 
set up and operate. 
 
Environmental Challenges  
For the sake of completeness we must add the additional challenges that Bangladesh 
faces as a result of the gradual global warming that is clearly taking place. As 
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Bangladesh contributes almost nothing to global warming, we can do very little to 
ameliorate this problem. If the worst were to happen and sea levels were to rise so that 
ten per cent or more of our land mass were lost, we would in any case be in a world 
where there would be significant population movements all around. Bangladeshis 
would not be drowning in coastal areas, they would move. So would the people in 
Mumbai, Chennai and possibly London. While we should certainly think about 
coping strategies, we have to resist a new rent-seeking game where politicians in 
threatened countries seek and are awarded small amounts of western aid in lieu of 
damages potentially caused to them by global warming. This activity diverts our 
attention from the real challenges of development and will not help us if the worst 
were to happen. On the other hand, if we can develop broad domestic competitive 
capabilities, our people would be able to gradually move and claim new territory to 
live on if the worst were to happen. In the meantime our strategy should be to grow 
and industrialize in the greenest possible way. There are therefore important 
environmental issues that we need to deal with, including assessing sustainable 
strategies of development, and dealing with problems of river waters and other 
environmental issues that are not directly connected with global warming. 
 
This brief list of economic challenges is by no means a comprehensive one. My 
intention in this paper is simply to pick three areas of concern which seem particularly 
important to me to suggest that we need to think innovatively about implementable 
policy and institutional reforms. To do this we need to learn from historical 
experiences, and particularly from the experiences of countries that have been 
successful at sustaining growth and development. The strategies and solutions of other 
countries cannot be copied blindly because political and social environments differ 
across countries. Inevitably, the policy and institutional solutions that Bangladesh 
may evolve will be different in detail from solutions that worked elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, our solutions have to solve similar problems, and if we understand the 
problems that others addressed and solved, we are more likely to think of the 
solutions that may work in Bangladesh. Policy-making along these lines is clearly an 
involved process of discussion and experimentation, and it requires developing 
national awareness and constructing a broad consensus about the importance of 
particular strategies and policies.  
 
While these policy and institutional challenges are difficult, Bangladesh has been at 
the global forefront in institutional innovations in areas such as microcredit and 
NGOs. We now need to focus our energies on feasible institution-building within the 
state that can address our pressing economic challenges. The programmes of ‘good 
governance’ and market promotion that have influenced our policy-makers in the past 
do not provide adequate answers to these challenges. In addition, the good governance 
programme is not implementable to any significant degree in the short to medium run, 
as the experience of the Emergency Government of 2007-09 showed in the clearest 
possible way. A new approach to governance and reform that addresses pragmatic 
problems in feasible ways is required. In this article I summarize some of the possible 
responses to the major challenges facing Bangladesh, and I suggest some of the 
governance capabilities and institutions that we need to start thinking about. 
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2. The Limits of ‘Good Governance’ Strategies 
Governance is what states do. The importance given to governance in recent policy 
discussions is a welcome recognition of the importance of the state in promoting and 
enabling economic development. However, the contemporary understanding of 
governance has been largely driven by a framework of analysis that is not appropriate 
for understanding the developmental constraints faced by developing countries. This 
partial and sometimes flawed analysis has underpinned the support for enabling ‘good 
governance’. This agenda focuses on building state capacities to enforce property 
rights, sustain a good rule of law, fight corruption and enhance democratic 
accountability. While these are all desirable goals, the evidence shows that despite 
much policy effort and international assistance, progress towards ‘good governance’ 
has been very slow and small improvements that are occasionally achieved 
(particularly in anti-corruption) are just as frequently reversed. Moreover, the 
assumption that progress on good governance is a precondition for developing 
countries to integrate into the global economy is also flawed. The historical evidence 
does not support this expectation and a closer look at the theory suggests that the good 
governance analysis ignores some important governance challenges that confront 
developing countries (Khan 2006, 2007). 
 
The international evidence strongly suggests that successful developing countries 
have not relied exclusively on market-promoting measures or on reforms that tried to 
institutionalize ‘good governance’ alone. While good governance identifies desirable 
objectives, no developing country has made significant progress on these objectives at 
early stages of development. As a result, high scores on good governance could not 
have been a precondition for developmental success. The prior achievement of ‘good 
governance’ certainly cannot explain the success of China, South Korea, Malaysia or 
Japan at the early stages of their development, nor of the more successful regions of 
India, nor our own successes in the garments and other industries. This does not mean 
that governance and institution-building are not important. But it does mean that we 
may have been focusing on the wrong governance priorities and trying to achieve 
unattainable institutional and governance goals instead of setting ourselves achievable 
and critical ones that are necessary for developmental success.  
 
The reasons why market liberalization and attempts at ‘good governance’ reforms 
have not been sufficient for ensuring development are not really surprising. Markets 
and market-supporting policies are of course very important because they open up 
trading opportunities. Efficient markets may also help to attract investments into 
profitable sectors. But the problem of developing countries is that to begin with, most 
of the population have no capabilities to participate in competitive international 
markets. The competitive capabilities of both workers and entrepreneurs have to be 
developed and this typically requires carefully designed public-private partnerships to 
develop these capabilities. Economic theory suggests that if ‘good governance’ could 
be achieved, in particular if well defined property rights and a good rule of law 
allowed effective contract enforcement, private investors from all over the world 
would feel confident to come and finance capability development. They would do so 
in their own self-interest, arguably because wages in the developing country were 
lower. This argument is fine in theory but in fact we find that very few developing 
countries have succeeded in attracting significant amounts of foreign capital to build 
new productive capabilities without very specific policies (with the exception of 
interest in extracting oil or other natural resources). The countries that do attract 
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significant foreign capital in setting up productive enterprises in new sectors (like 
China or Malaysia in an earlier phase) did not necessarily score very highly on ‘good 
governance’ but did have institutions that created incentives for foreign investors and 
policies that ensured that these investments created national capabilities.  
 
Without such institutions and policies, developing countries would not succeed in 
building capabilities, even if they could achieve a reasonably good rule of law and 
property rights. This is because private enterprise is obviously and legitimately always 
more interested in immediate profits and we should not expect otherwise. As a result, 
in the absence of specific incentives, private capital will search for countries and 
sectors where workers and managers already exist with ready-made productive 
capabilities. Private capital does not and should not be expected to take risks to 
develop new national capabilities, where the bulk of the benefit will go to the country 
and only partially to the entrepreneur. Economists call this type of problem an 
externality or market failure, and there are many such market failures that we ignore 
at our peril when we rely only on markets to solve problems of development. 
Moreover, achieving high levels of contract enforcement and stable property rights in 
poor countries is virtually impossible in any case. Property rights, rule of law, 
accountability and low corruption are ‘public goods’ that are undoubtedly highly 
desirable in the long run but they are not free goods. It costs a lot of tax revenue to 
institute systems and structures to deliver these public goods. Governments have to 
have significant tax revenues before they can finance the expenditures that are 
required to ensure high levels of property right stability and contract enforcement and 
other features of good governance. These desirable aspects of ‘good governance’ 
cannot be achieved simply because a government announces its ‘political will’ to 
achieve these things, or because it uses coercive force to achieve them. Our own 
experience with the Emergency Government of 2007-09 demonstrates this even if we 
ignore the experiences of other countries.  
 
The three interdependent areas of governance which actually appear to play a 
significant role in enabling development are first, the maintenance of political stability 
through different forms of rent distribution, secondly, the management of difficult 
property right allocations to sustain growth and finally the promotion of technology 
absorption and capability development through learning. Successful countries used 
specific governance and institutional arrangements that addressed some of the 
important challenges in these areas. The first set of governance challenges describes 
the political and institutional arrangements of rent distribution through which order is 
maintained in developing countries. These arrangements can be more or less 
successful in maintaining political stability and achieving social justice, but they do 
not correlate very well with a simplistic extension of electoral democracy. This should 
not be surprising because electoral processes in poor countries do not necessarily 
translate into stability. One reason for this is the structural mismatch between fiscal 
resources and expectations. This is not an argument against electoral democracy, but 
rather for understanding that electoral democracy as a process clearly does not 
necessarily guarantee political stability. Stability depends much more on the 
organization and motivation of political parties. To what extent are dominant political 
parties in the country able to achieve sustainable redistributive arrangements that 
maintain social stability and yet allow rapid development to take place? This is clearly 
an important area of concern (Khan 2010), but one that we will not focus on in this 
paper.  
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The second governance capacity refers to the institutional and political processes 
through which property rights are transformed and transferred to emerging growth 
sectors in developing countries. There are wide variations in the institutional 
arrangements that are effective, but again, success does not correlate with a simple 
measure of support for the rule of law or protection of existing property rights. This 
too is not surprising because existing property rights are typically incomplete and 
inappropriate and markets are too inefficient for assets to be transferred through 
private contracting. Moreover, feasible improvements in the protection of existing 
property rights and the rule of law are not likely to reduce transaction costs to such an 
extent that the market can be expected to allocate resources effectively. As developing 
countries face serious inefficiencies in land and asset markets, the governance 
capabilities for resolving conflicts and assisting the allocation of assets to more 
productive sectors are vital. The critical governance capabilities here are institutional 
and political arrangements that can assist the transfer of land and other assets to 
growth-enhancing uses while maintaining political stability through adequate 
processes of compensation. The latter requires that transfers are consistent with social 
perceptions of justice and achieve a broad-based sharing of the benefits of growth.  
 
Finally, a third critical area of governance refers to the capabilities of states to provide 
assistance to accelerate technology absorption and movements up the global value 
chain. There are significant ‘market failures’ that ensure that the natural rate of 
technology absorption through purely private initiatives is likely to be too slow. Even 
when private sector-led technology absorption does happen, it is likely to drive 
growth in already high capability sectors rather than contributing to the opening up of 
new areas. Without governance capabilities for implementing appropriate policies, 
employment and wages are likely to grow too slowly. These problems too are not 
likely to be adequately addressed by conventional improvements in the rule of law or 
the investment climate. Feasible improvements in these areas are unlikely to result in 
sufficiently efficient markets such that technology absorption and learning can be led 
by finance provided on the basis of private contracting.  More targeted governance 
arrangements, policies and financial institutions are typically required and this is 
indeed what we find in the most successful countries and in successful sectors within 
developing countries (for a discussion of the underlying evidence and theory see Khan 
2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010).  
 
The importance of these three areas of governance explains a number of puzzles in the 
international evidence on governance and development. The success of dynamic 
developers like South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, or China and high-growth regions of 
India today, cannot be explained by their prior achievement of high scores on good 
governance. They would all score rather low on good governance indicators at an 
early stage of their developmental takeoffs. In my research referred to in this article, I 
look at their developmental governance capabilities in critical areas, and it is clear 
that they had growth-enhancing governance capabilities that allowed them to trigger 
and sustain growth over long periods. They were good at maintaining political 
stability, at transforming and transferring property rights to high-growth sectors 
without excessive social injustice or instability, and in particular they were good at 
creating incentives and compulsions for accelerated technology absorption. As their 
economies and societies transformed, they gradually began to develop the broader 
governance capabilities that are identified in the good governance approach, but these 
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were certainly not achieved prior to their growth takeoffs and so cannot explain the 
success of their economies. Secondly, this analysis can also help to explain why 
developing countries following the advice of international agencies and focusing on 
market liberalization and good governance capabilities have not achieved the same 
kind of success. If good governance capabilities are very difficult to attain in poor 
countries, and if these limited improvements make a limited contribution to the 
efficiency of market contracting, it is not surprising that following a governance 
agenda based solely on the good governance analysis has not achieved significant 
development success. This is regardless of the fact that many of the good governance 
conditions are desirable in their own right. 
 
The three broad areas referred to above are also closely interrelated, which can 
explain why failure in one area is likely to eventually undermine progress on others. 
Political stability can only be maintained if employment and wage growth are 
expanding and conflicts over property rights do not result in social turmoil. Sustaining 
a property rights transition in turn requires a broader framework of political stability, 
and also requires that those who acquire rights over assets are able to use them 
productively by absorbing new technologies from more advanced countries. 
Otherwise, assets remain unproductive. If this happens, asset owners and the state 
may both begin to lose their legitimacy if jobs and welfare fail to improve, with 
implications for political stability. Finally, a strategy of technology absorption 
requires that investors can acquire or access de facto property rights over the assets 
and resources they require and also that there is some minimal level of political 
stability. Given these interdependencies, a failure to sustain technology absorption is 
likely to create serious challenges for vulnerable democracies in developing countries 
because political stability depends not just on a growing tax base but more directly on 
the growth of employment and wages.  
 
In the subsequent sections, I will outline some types of immediate governance and 
policy challenges that need to be addressed if development is to be sustained. These 
examples show that the challenges facing developing countries in a competitive 
international environment are not going to be easy. But they are also not impossible 
challenges: for instance, they do not require the immediate achievement of all-round 
good governance or other goals that no other developing country has achieved. The 
latter should remain an aspiration to which developing countries should strive. But the 
immediate focus of policy should be to learn from the institutional and policy 
approaches that have actually worked in other countries to construct a number of vital 
institutions and governance capabilities that are likely to solve immediate 
development problems.  
 
3. Capability Development and Spreading Industrial Success  
The first area that I think is of great importance is the need to create broad based 
productive employment opportunities in society. Whatever our view of what 
development means, a society that fails to achieve this is unlikely to develop. By 
productive I mean employment that is globally competitive and therefore does not 
need direct or hidden subsidies to keep afloat, though I will argue that some degree of 
public support is initially necessary in most cases given the nature of market failures 
facing capability development. The problem here is that despite wages that are a 
fraction of those in advanced countries and despite being able to freely buy machinery 
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and equipment in international markets at virtually the same price as in advanced 
countries, developing countries typically find that there are very few areas in industry, 
agriculture or services in which they can achieve global competitiveness. Without 
global competitiveness, sustained growth in these activities is slow and uncertain not 
only because export opportunities are not available, but also because imports are 
likely to eventually undermine domestic production.  
 
The answer to the puzzle of missing competitiveness is that low wages do not 
compensate for the very low initial productivity of developing countries in almost 
every activity including relatively low technology ones. This means that products of 
the right quality cannot be produced at internationally prevailing prices. Low 
productivity is in turn attributable to the absence of knowledge about modern 
production, not just at the level of techniques but also about diverse activities like 
managing modern factory layouts, inventory management, sales and service and so 
on. Simple factors like reducing input wastage a few percentage points can mean the 
difference between success and failure given the narrow margins on most low 
technology manufacturing activities. The type of know-how at issue is not something 
that is taught or can be taught in schools and technical colleges. So while overall 
education is highly desirable, investment in education is not on its own sufficient to 
solve the problem of low initial productivity in almost every tradable productive 
activity. Given the surplus of workers with formal education in the typical developing 
country (as evidenced by emigration across all skill categories), a focus on education 
may not even be necessary to trigger broad-based growth, though over time, the 
supply of workers with formal education is likely to become a constraint without 
investment in education. In most areas, most developing countries have an excess 
supply of labour: the problem is that they cannot productively employ them. 
 
The most likely mechanism through which knowledge of actual production processes 
is actually learnt is through the process of ‘learning-by-doing’. Individuals and groups 
have to continuously adapt and experiment with available technologies to achieve 
competitiveness given domestic capabilities, infrastructures and environments. For 
some activities, global competitiveness cannot be feasibly achieved given the gap in 
capabilities. But for many activities, competitiveness could have been achieved if 
resources and effort were put into learning-by-doing given existing formal 
capabilities. Learning-by-doing is not easy and many failures are likely to happen 
along with the occasional successes. But the occasional successes drive an economy 
and society forward, creating employment opportunities and helping people to rise out 
of poverty. The governance and policy task is to provide a supportive policy 
framework for learning-by-doing to take place in new sectors, together with 
governance capabilities to ensure that technology absorption and learning proceed at 
the fastest possible rate without resources being wasted. Technologies are effectively 
absorbed if productivity growth increases sufficiently for production with a particular 
set of equipment to become globally competitive. Once this happens, that particular 
technology can be more easily replicated across society by workers and managers 
migrating to other firms and taking their tacit knowledge with them, managers setting 
up their own firms, and so on. This significantly shortens the learning times of other 
firms and accelerates the development of clusters of similar firms.  
 
The policy challenge is to understand why this does not happen more frequently in 
developing countries. At its heart is a financing problem: effectively a period of risk 
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and loss-making has to be financed while the learning is taking place. In theory this 
period of loss-making could be financed by private investors because the eventual 
stream of profits should more than compensate for temporary periods of losses. But 
private financing is the exception rather than the rule and private investors have 
demonstrated extreme reluctance in financing technology absorption in developing 
countries. In contrast, and for obvious reasons, private investors have been very keen 
to invest in sectors and activities where a developing country already has competitive 
advantage. A number of reasons have been put forward to explain why private 
contracting is likely to be inadequate for the development of new sectors and 
capabilities. These focus on different types of ‘market failures’ (for a review of 
different models see Khan 2009b). These include ‘big push’ arguments that say that 
learning in one sector is unlikely to succeed without simultaneous demand expansion 
across a range of related sectors (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Murphy, et al. 1989). The 
argument here is that competitiveness and profitability depend on other domestic 
sectors creating demand for the products of this particular sector. But as markets are 
not limited to domestic ones, this does not offer a sufficient explanation for why a 
number of export-oriented sectors do not sequentially develop in these countries.  
 
A more recent explanation is that globally competitive sectors have to be ‘discovered’ 
by entrepreneurs, but entrepreneurs who take the risk to discover these sectors face 
rapid imitation by newcomers and the new entrants (it is argued) rapidly reduce the 
rents (high profits) that the initial entrepreneurs expected (Hausmann and Rodrik 
2003). This appears to be a plausible model but it has a number of flaws. It assumes 
that countries have implicit comparative advantages for producing certain types of 
products and entrepreneurs have to discover these. This is not a plausible hypothesis. 
It is unlikely that some population groups have an innate advantage in making bed-
sheets while others are innately good at making hats in the way that Hausmann and 
Rodrik suggest in their comparison of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Moreover, in most 
types of export-oriented activities in developing countries, new entrants are not likely 
to reduce the profits of the initial entrepreneurs. Global markets have prices for most 
products that are unlikely to shift as a result of a few more new entrants. Moreover, 
wages are very low in developing countries and likely to remain so because of large 
pools of unemployment. New entrants in a particular sector, even a labour-intensive 
one like garments and textiles are unlikely to absorb so much labour that wages begin 
to rise significantly simply as a result of imitation. So if investments in discovery are 
low it must be that entrepreneurs are risk averse anyway, not that they are prevented 
from investing because of their fear of declining profitability due to the entry of others 
later on.  
 
A more plausible explanation that is consistent with the observed facts of technology 
acquisition in developing countries focuses on the role of financing and the 
enforcement of contracts. If achieving competitiveness and profitability requires 
learning-by-doing, then a period of loss-making has to be financed when new sectors 
or upgraded technologies are first introduced. The problem is that loss-financing by 
itself does not ensure that the learning will take place at the fastest rate, because 
learning also requires significant effort by managers, workers, suppliers and others 
and this collectively determines the competitiveness of the production process. If 
effort is insufficient, financiers can lose their money as the accumulation of losses can 
make the project unviable. Here, the overall context of a weak rule of law and weak 
contract enforcement is indirectly relevant. If contracts were enforceable and could 
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protect the interests of investors, this may induce more of them to invest in projects 
involving significant learning. In principle, therefore, the argument that an 
improvement in contract enforcement could enhance investment in developing 
countries is theoretically plausible. But in practice a significant improvement in the 
rule of law and contract enforcement is not achievable in the short to medium term. 
This is why different types of public-private partnerships that implicitly shared the 
costs and risks of investing in new areas played a significant role in the catching-up 
processes of developing countries. But for these arrangements to work, appropriate 
governance capabilities had to exist to ensure that the support was not wasted. High 
levels of effort are only assured if the opportunities created for learning are 
accompanied by limitations on the period of support, or even better, if they are 
associated with performance monitoring during the period of support and credible 
mechanisms of withdrawal of support if performance is unsatisfactory.  
 
Case studies of successful technological upgrading and the emergence of new sectors 
in developing countries show that loss-financing through different mechanisms was 
very important for enabling investments. But success also required that the financing 
came with credible incentives and compulsions that ensured high levels of effort. This 
is supported by case studies that I have studied of industries in Thailand, India, 
Bangladesh and other countries that achieved global competitiveness even in the 
period of global ‘liberalization’ after 1980 (Khan 2009b). The ambitious industrial 
policy strategies characteristic of the East Asian developers achieved limited 
successes in many countries because their political contexts did not allow the 
centralized disciplining of subsidy recipients that was necessary to ensure high levels 
of effort. Many countries including India, Bangladesh and Thailand began to abandon 
ambitious industrial policies in the 1980s as a result. The problems of learning and 
achieving competitiveness in new sectors did not disappear, however, but now more 
sector-specific solutions emerged. The solutions were sometimes planned but were 
often unplanned results of policies that sometimes created appropriate incentives and 
compulsions for learning with high levels of effort. The mechanisms and governance 
arrangements that achieved successful results varied significantly across countries and 
even across sectors and regions within the same country. But the general feature that 
successful sectors shared in common was a combination of a period of loss financing 
and credible incentives and compulsions that ensured high levels of effort.  
 
The best way to discuss the importance of financing learning processes is to recall our 
own experience in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has enjoyed high growth in 
manufacturing driven by the spectacular success of the garments industry since the 
1980s. To some extent this success has been helped by the fact that Bangladesh has 
some of the lowest wages compared to its competitors and even today has one of the 
lowest labour costs per hour in the global garments and textiles business. But even 
with its labour cost advantage, Bangladesh did not break into the garments business 
without a number of critical financing accidents that allowed it to build the 
capabilities that started the industry off on its road to success. The story is extremely 
important for us because it shows that even a labour-intensive and apparently low 
technology activity required a period of learning and capability building. Moreover, it 
is unlikely that this learning and capability building would have been entirely 
financed by private investors in the absence of the very fortunate implicit financing 
that became available as a result of a fortunate conjuncture that involved the Multi-
Fibre Arrangement (MFA).  
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The growth of the ready-made garments industry in Bangladesh has often been 
presented as a vindication of the success of free market policies combined with the 
virtual absence of labour market protections in Bangladesh. A closer look at the 
history suggests that in fact investment even in the simplest of technologies involves 
significant risks for domestic investors when these technologies are new to the 
workers and managers in the economy. The time it will take to become globally 
competitive cannot be known in advance and entrepreneurs have little idea of what is 
required to achieve competitiveness in new and very specialized globalized 
production networks. Nor is it viable for foreign firms to invest in up-skilling labour 
in a poor economy in low-margin, low technology industries unless there is some 
cost-sharing and risk-sharing for the foreign firm. This is of course why a significant 
part of global production does not immediately shift to poorer countries. To 
understand the garment sector takeoff in Bangladesh, we have to look at the special 
and fortunate combination of factors that enabled the transfer of globally competitive 
garment producing technology to Bangladesh in the early 1980s.  
 
An important component of this fortunate conjuncture was the emergence of the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) of 1973. This was an arrangement administered by 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). MFA set bilaterally negotiated 
quotas on developing countries for textile and clothing exports primarily to satisfy US 
objections to free trade with garment producing countries which threatened the 
domestic garment and textile industry in the USA. As a concession to global opinion, 
the MFA did not put quotas on a number of least developed countries like Bangladesh 
which did not have any garment industry at the time and were therefore no threat to 
the US (Goto 1989). The MFA implicitly created ‘quota rents’ for Bangladesh 
because quotas meant Bangladesh had the privilege of beginning to produce garments 
even though it was not the least-cost producer and would not have succeeded in a free 
market to compete with existing producers despite its lower wage. This implicitly 
created incentives for countries like South Korea to support the setting up of garments 
production in Bangladesh so that they could at least export their fabrics. This allowed 
the ‘doing’ to start in Bangladesh, but the ‘doing’ does not necessarily result in 
‘learning’ unless other conditions create compulsions to actually put in high levels of 
effort and achieve international competitiveness quickly.  
 
Bangladesh was additionally fortuitous in having some of these other conditions as 
well in the emerging garments sector. Just at that time a potential investor class was 
emerging through the ‘primitive accumulation’ that took place after independence in 
1971. This new class of investors had money and were looking for productive 
activities in which they could invest. They did not expect to continue to make money 
through primitive accumulation unless they could become competitive in international 
markets. When the first garment factories began production in Bangladesh and started 
making profits rapidly by successfully engaging in the learning process, other 
potential investors rapidly understood the viability of investing in learning in this 
sector. They were further helped by the availability of managers and workers in the 
already successful firms who could be poached easily. And finally, Bangladesh at that 
time had an ‘investor-friendly’ leader in the form of President Zia who saw the 
importance of underwriting foreign investments in the sector using informal support 
at the highest level. It was the concurrence of these favourable factors that enabled 
private investors to take risks to build new capabilities in Bangladesh, and they took 
15 
 
these risks because these lucky factors significantly reduced the risks that would 
otherwise have constrained capability development. 
 
The capability development process in the garment industry began with the 
collaboration between a retired Bangladeshi civil servant turned entrepreneur, Nurul 
Quader Khan, and a South Korean multinational, Daewoo. The Bangladeshi 
entrepreneur set up Desh Garments in 1979 and provided all the capital for the 
investment in plant and machinery. The government provided vital support by 
promising supportive policy changes for a potentially risky investment. The critical 
part of the story is that the South Korean multinational provided the training and 
technology transfer upfront (thereby financing the learning), with their outlays to be 
recovered as a percentage of the future exports of Desh. The South Koreans hosted 
around 130 Bangladeshis at their plant in Pusan, teaching them not only how 
competitive garments production was organized but also giving them a hands-on idea 
about factory layouts, the pace of work, quality control and so on. If we look at the 
incentives of the different parties in this arrangement, we can see why everyone had 
strong incentives and compulsions to put in high levels of effort into the learning and 
capability-building process. Daewoo had strong incentives to push the training 
process and to transfer knowledge and capabilities to the visiting Bangladeshis 
because this was the fastest way to recover their investment. The Bangladeshis had 
strong incentives to learn because hanging on in Pusan was not an indefinite option 
and returning without the capability would ensure that they and the firm would not 
survive.   
 
The quota protection was important not only for inducing Daewoo to look for 
offshore manufacturing processes that could use its fabrics. It also reduced the 
competitiveness gap that Bangladesh had to climb. It still had to engage in learning to 
be able to export, but the narrower gap made it credible that the Bangladeshi company 
would be able to quickly pay back the up-front investment of the South Koreans in 
training the visiting Bangladeshis. In a quota-constrained export market, Bangladesh 
would only need to make a more limited improvement in its productivity to become 
globally competitive, and this significantly reduced the risks for the private 
entrepreneurs investing in capability development. The fact that there was a 
Bangladeshi entrepreneur willing and able to make the upfront investment in plant 
and machinery also reduced the risk for Daewoo because it established the 
commitment of the Bangladeshi firm to the success of the project. In addition the 
president of the country credibly promised that a small number of critical institutional 
changes would be made effective very quickly and this further reduced the risks 
facing the achievement of competitiveness by Desh. Explicit support was provided to 
the project by President Ziaur Rahman. The President had taken the initiative in the 
first place in linking up Nurul Quader with Kim Woo-Choong, the chairman of 
Daewoo. He also assured the South Koreans that unexpected problems would be dealt 
with or at least addressed. And in fact, political support at the highest level assured 
the South Koreans that relatively small but critical institutional innovations like the 
back-to-back LC (which allowed Bangladeshi producers to borrow from local banks 
using export orders as collateral) and the bonded warehouse (which allowed complex 
customs duties on imported inputs to be avoided) would be quickly introduced.  
 
Desh was remarkably successful. Between 1981 and 1987 its export value grew at an 
annual average of 90 per cent (Rahman 2004). The learning and transfer of 
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technology that was unleashed by this single project was remarkable. By the end of 
the 1980s, of the 130 people who were first trained by Desh in Daewoo’s factories in 
South Korea, 115 became entrepreneurs and set up their own garment firms (Rhee 
1990: 341). This apparently did not do much damage to Desh, whose output 
continued to grow at close to one hundred per cent per annum during this period. The 
loss the company suffered when it lost a manager was made up many times over by 
the high levels of effort that these individuals invested in the first place as a result of 
this implicit incentive. Afterwards, normal market competition took over and the 
migration of skilled workers and managers worked to create an industrial cluster that 
attracted buyers and created its own beneficial dynamic to drive growth in the sector. 
From virtually a zero base in 1980, by 2005 there were around 3500 active firms in 
the garments sector directly employing well over two million people (World Bank 
2005). Primitive accumulation continued to be an important source of entrepreneurial 
supply. In a survey carried out in 1993, 23% of garment factory owners responded 
that they had originally been civil servants or in the army (Quddus and Rashid 2000). 
We can assume that many others had close contact with politics and had made their 
initial capital through political processes. From a country not much different from the 
typical African country in the 1970s, Bangladesh’s manufacturing output today equals 
that of all of sub-Saharan Africa combined excluding South Africa.  
 
The rapid emergence of Bangladesh as a garment exporting country is shown in Table 
4. Exports grew at double digit rates for more than two decades. By the early 2000s, 
the sector accounted for around 70% of Bangladeshi exports. By 1985, such was the 
success of the Bangladesh garment industry that Ronald Reagan negotiated quotas for 
Bangladesh under the MFA (Rashid 2006). Bangladesh has continued to benefit from 
preferential treatment, particularly in European Union markets, but effectively, the 
first five years of quota protection were enough to trigger a major shift in the 
country’s technological capabilities and therefore its manufacturing fortune. 
 
Table 1 Bangladesh Garments: Growth Rates of Dollar Exports 1985-2006 
Year Woven Knitwear Total Garments Dollar Export Growth 
Rates 
1985-1990   45.9 
1990-1995   24.1 
1995-2000   14.3 
2000-01   11.7 
2001-02 –7.1 –2.5 –5.7 
2002-03 4.3 13.3 7.2 
2003-04 8.6 29.9 15.8 
2004-05 1.7 31.3 12.9 
2005-06 13.5 35.4 23.1 
Sources: (based on  Mlachila and Yang 2004: Table 1; World Bank 2005: Table 1). 
 
The experience of Bangladesh in setting up its garments industry is not unique. A 
very similar story can be told for other important sectors in developing countries, like 
the automobile and pharmaceutical sectors of India and the electronics industry of 
Thailand (Khan 2009b). In all these cases, the initial capabilities that allowed a major 
industrial takeoff in a sector were developed because some ‘non-market’ source of 
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implicit financing was available that reduced the costs and risks of capability 
development by private investors. But these breaks only worked if the institutional 
and incentive structure ensured that the entrepreneurs and workers getting the 
privilege of building capabilities felt strong compulsions for putting in high levels of 
effort to achieve global competitiveness relatively quickly. When public-private 
partnerships or indeed industrial policy protections and subsidies provided 
opportunities for learning without the compulsion for companies to put in high levels 
of effort, the exercise typically failed and the financing was wasted. 
 
The challenge for Bangladesh as we try to create new sectors, or even to assist the 
garment and textile industry to move up the global value chain is to create the 
appropriate new capabilities. In each case, private sector investors face significant 
risks and uncertainties because the required capabilities do not exist and investment in 
capability development can be very slow without financing arrangements that reduce 
the risks of investing in new capability development. The combination of incentives 
and compulsions that worked in the early stages of the garment industry with MFA 
cannot be reproduced in other sectors. Indeed other sectors will have different 
technologies, different issues with capability transfer, different opportunities for 
financing, and different global market conditions. As a result, the governance and 
financing solutions will inevitably be different. 
 
If we go to the core of the issue, fully or partially financing an initial period of loss-
making when new technologies are being learnt is one of the important requirements 
for start-ups even in new sectors, even if they are low technology sectors like 
garments. In principle, markets should enable the learning to be financed but there are 
significant market failures because uncertain periods of learning expose investors to 
levels of risk that are often too high given the narrow margins in these established 
sectors (Khan 2000, 2009b). Our experience in the garments industry has implications 
as Bangladesh attempts to move higher up the value chain. Much of its growth so far 
has been at the lower ends of the value chain, even though there is evidence of 
growing backward linkages and diversification. By 2005, roughly 45% of export 
value was added in the domestic economy due to growing backward linkages in 
spinning, weaving, dyeing and accessories (Bhattacharya, et al. 2002; World Bank 
2005; Ahmed and Hossain 2006). But our survey of the garment sector in 2007 
revealed that the available types of financing were an important constraint to 
technology upgrading in the sector (Khan 2008a). Banks were willing to lend to 
investors in the garment sector but the interest obligations and collateral requirements 
deterred investors in new sectors and technologies who were not sure about the length 
of time learning would take. A small delay in achieving global competitiveness with 
interest piling up could make a major project unviable. This is despite the fact that 
bank funding in general was not scarce and established investors had no difficulty in 
borrowing significant sums for projects where they already had capabilities to be 
globally competitive. This explains the rapid horizontal growth of the garments 
industry, and the relatively slow progress up the value chain, and the relatively slow 
progress in industrial diversification. The aim of policy must be to accelerate our 
move up the value chain as well as to support new industrial clusters like electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding and machine tools with appropriate financing 
arrangements to accelerate learning processes.  
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The obvious conclusion must be that a more rapid expansion of learning has to be 
based on creating new financial institutions that specialize in providing term finance 
at attractive interest rates for start-up companies in new sectors and sectors where we 
want to promote new industrial clusters. But these financial institutions have to have 
carefully designed governance and incentive structures to replicate the incentives and 
compulsions that resulted in high levels of effort in sectors like the Bangladesh 
garment industry. Specialized financial institutions that are set up for this purpose are 
only likely to do this if governance capabilities are also developed to support these 
types of lending. For instance, given that the rule of law and contract enforcement are 
not well developed in general, it will be necessary to develop specific governance 
agencies and capabilities that focus on regulating and enforcing loans designated as 
start-up loans for new sectors. And given the limited reform capabilities and skilled 
personnel in developing countries this also implies that these types of developmental 
governance capabilities need to be identified as national development priorities.  
 
This is an important observation as development financing institutions played a 
negligible role in financing new learning and capability development in the period 
after the 1980s. Banks have played an important part in driving the industrial growth 
of Bangladesh, but they have typically played a major role once the difficult task of 
capability development and learning had already been financed and achieved through 
other processes. Normal commercial banks lend against machines, land and assets, but 
loss-financing during learning is not backed by assets. It is backed by the 
organizational capital of an organization, and the value of this depends on the effort 
the organization puts in. Development banks were supposed to finance the building of 
new productive organizations but stopped playing a significant role in the 1980s with 
the demise of industrial development banks like the Shilpa Rin Shangstha and Shilpa 
Bank in Bangladesh. Similar banks in many other countries also performed rather 
poorly because they failed to achieve the internal governance structures that could 
provide strong incentives for ensuring high levels of effort amongst their borrowers. 
To design financial institutions that can effectively finance capability development 
better in the future, we need to properly absorb insights from the success of particular 
sectors like the garment industry which enjoyed a period of implicit financing through 
accidental devices like the MFA. The incentives and compulsions that induced high 
levels of effort in these successful industries need to be replicated in the operational 
and governance procedures of new development finance institutions. 
 
The most important lesson from these experiences is that financial instruments that 
can assist learning can only be successful if the instruments are designed and 
governed to induce high levels of effort in capability development. Most important, a 
lot of attention has to be given to designing the governance and management of these 
institutions if they are to have the appropriate effect. It is better to start on a small 
scale, experiment with the design of the institution and the financial instruments and 
the governance structures that it uses, and then scale up gradually with experience. 
The need to ensure high levels of effort on the part of the enterprises being financed to 
develop new capabilities is of paramount importance. High collateral requirements 
(which is the route followed by commercial banks) are not an effective way of 
ensuring effort on the part of borrowers because the risk and uncertainty of investing 
in learning and capability development means that private investors will not borrow 
significant amounts backed by their own collateral for capability development 
projects. This is precisely the market failure that we have to address. On the other 
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hand, loans without adequate collateral also have poor effects and can lead to low 
effort and wastage unless banks have strong internal governance structures of 
monitoring and withdrawing capital from poorly performing projects.  
 
Alternatively, innovative financing instruments can be experimented with such as 
providing finance through equity holdings. But these also have problems if they are 
not well designed. An example is the Equity and Enterprise Fund that is already in 
operation in Bangladesh to promote new start-ups in new areas. This is a good idea in 
principle but as a financial instrument to promote learning it has not generated much 
success so far. Its limitations can be traced to its design, and is related to the 
insufficient incentives and compulsions for enterprises to put in sustained high levels 
of effort (Khan 2008a). For instance, if the equity financing instrument allows 
entrepreneurs to survive without making or fully declaring their profits, not only does 
the financing institution fail to get a return on its investment, more importantly, the 
enterprise may not perceive any great compulsion to improve its capabilities. 
Moreover, if procedures for capital withdrawal from unsuccessful ventures are not 
very credible, the pressure on the enterprise to put in high levels of effort will be even 
lower. By looking more closely at the drivers of successful capability building in 
Bangladesh and elsewhere, financial institutions and instruments can be much better 
designed to accelerate capability development appropriate for setting up new sectors 
and industrial clusters.  
 
There are many ways in which we could begin to address some of the incentive and 
governance problems facing the financing of capability development. In an export-
oriented industry, the value of exports is difficult to hide. As a result, financial 
institutions can get a fair return and create incentives for the firm to put in effort if the 
return on the ‘equity investment’ was linked to export earnings. If this was combined 
with a time bound equity investment which could be withdrawn if minimum export 
earnings were not achieved within a predetermined number of years, a viable 
combination of incentives and compulsions could be achieved for investors which 
would not impose excessive risk on them, but would also create compulsions for 
effort. But these conditions are only likely to have the desired effect on capability 
development in new sectors if entrepreneurs believe that the rules are enforceable. 
This in turn requires that the development finance institution is recognized as a 
national priority and gets non-partisan support from the political leadership to achieve 
its developmental goals. A generalized rule of law is too ambitious for a developing 
country, but a commitment from political leaderships to construct one or two 
relatively small institutions that will drive critical national goals may be achievable if 
the importance of these institutions is widely understood. After all, there are one or 
two institutions that work relatively well in any country. In Bangladesh, for example, 
the central bank is an institution that works reasonably well. The point is to be 
pragmatic and identify a small number of additional vital institutions that need to be 
built.  
 
4. The Political Economy of Land and Natural Resources 
Conflicts over land and resources are an important and occasionally fatal constraint 
that can hit developing countries if they do not take adequate preparations in time, 
with the requisite political participation. If we look at our own slow progress in 
developing an effective Coal Policy, our difficulties in giving gas exploration rights to 
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foreign companies in a transparent way, and our difficulties in setting up industrial 
zones, the importance of this point will probably not need much stressing. The 
neighbouring state of West Bengal in India has gone into another phase of 
deindustrialization after the debacle at Shingur, largely because the ruling party 
mismanaged land acquisition issues and gave an opportunity for the opposition to play 
populist politics to block industrial land acquisition at Shingur and elsewhere (Khan 
2009a). There are many negative lessons to learn from India about how the failure to 
institute broadly legitimate processes of land acquisition can result in very serious 
social costs and even the blocking of development processes. In India, rapacious land 
grabbing by real estate businesses and other speculators, together with the often 
forceful evictions of tribals by mining companies led to not only a violent Maoist 
backlash, but also to strong internal opposition to investments that required land 
acquisition. In a big country like India, the blocking of development in a few states 
and even a massive Maoist insurgency still leaves large areas that can go on driving 
growth. However, were anything like that to be unleashed in the smaller territory of 
Bangladesh, we would be in very serious trouble. Bangladesh is a few years behind 
India in terms of the scale of land acquisition for new industrial and mineral 
development, and we clearly need to start building political and institutional 
arrangements to avoid the crisis that is already gripping many parts of India.  
 
The critical point about the political economy of land and resources in a developing 
country is that good governance and clear property rights on land and resources will 
not and cannot address this problem. We have already discussed why progress 
towards ‘good governance’ is likely to be painfully slow in developing countries, but 
in no area is this more apparent than in the political economy of the property rights 
transitions that developing countries go through (Khan 2009a). Developing countries 
that manage to navigate their way through the property rights transition with less 
social upheaval and resistance are not necessarily countries with better scores on good 
governance. Rather, they are countries that spent time and resources building a few 
institutions and the political consensus behind it to achieve the necessary allocations 
of assets and resources with the greatest degree of social fairness. This requires in 
particular the development of compensation arrangements that make sense and that 
are not captured by clientelist politicians. It is also important to ensure that the 
benefits from development are shared between investors and the broader society.  
 
Here too what works in different countries clearly depends very greatly on the 
political arrangements that exist within them. Even within India there is a very 
significant difference in the land acquisition and compensation policies across states, 
as well as in the degree of administrative control that different states have over land 
acquisition and allocation issues. This is not the place to review these variations in the 
historical experience, though the reader may refer to Khan (2009a) for a discussion on 
these important cross-country and cross-regional differences in the political economy 
of land and property right management. The only point that needs to be made is that 
we need to prioritize both institution building and the construction of a political 
consensus on the importance of resolving these issues in viable ways. The tendency in 
poor countries is for the partisan allocation of land and natural resources as the ruling 
party can allocate these resources to strengthen its political constituency. To some 
extent this is unavoidable. But it is also important for political parties and movements 
to initiate public discussions on these issues by setting out their own principles. How 
should national resources be best used (for instance, to maximize revenue for the 
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taxpayer or to maximize broader national development)? How should land for 
industrial expansion be acquired in places where land is very fragmented and property 
rights are not clear (which means that investors attempting to acquire land purely 
through the market will face very high transaction costs)? What should be the 
principles of compensation and who should be compensated (owners, residents, users 
of land or all of the above)? Do the principles of compensation change depending on 
the type of investment planned (natural resource extraction, real estate, infrastructure 
development or industrial investment)?  
 
It may be very plausibly argued that raising these issues will politicize an already 
politicized area and is not likely to bring great benefits for the policy-makers raising 
these questions. I cannot disagree more. The failure of our political parties to engage 
in high-level policy discussions on these issues and to evolve some semblance of a 
national consensus has resulted in an almost total logjam in developing our scarce 
fossil fuel resources and has created obstacles for developing new industrial zones and 
new infrastructure such as roads. As the pressure on resources brings forward 
informal and ad hoc solutions, typically involving very partisan decisions by ruling 
parties, the unresolved political questions are likely to hit us in the form of popular 
resistance and social turmoil as they have in other countries. Muddling through and 
‘managing’ may be an option at very early stages of development, but as the scale of 
development increases, we are likely to be suddenly hit by intense social resistance in 
a densely populated country if institutional and political capacities to address issues of 
land and resource management are not built up.  
 
Responsible political leadership should take the first steps to raise difficult questions, 
set up high-powered groups of policy-makers to suggest policy guidelines and 
institutions to handle these questions, and then test these ideas through broader 
national debates in the media. There are no right answers, but there are better and 
worse ways of doing these things, solutions that are more or less fair, and most 
importantly, solutions that are likely to be more or less acceptable given the political 
context of the country. It is imperative that if political parties want to promote rapid 
development, they should do their homework in preparing plans for a small number of 
high-powered institutional structures to address these issues and then create the 
political awareness and support base amongst important constituencies for the 
strategies of land and resource development that are being advocated. 
 
5. Accelerating Power Sector Investments  
The crisis with the painfully slow expansion of power generation capacity involves 
many of the political economy constraints affecting Bangladesh. Once again, without 
pragmatic steps that address some of these issues, progress is likely to continue to be 
very slow. The political blocking and lack of transparency in the power generation 
sector are well known. The standard response has been to focus on poor governance 
and institutional capacities in the sector, which are in general hard to refute, but I will 
argue that attempting to address these problems using ‘good governance’ reforms like 
attempting to improve transparency and accountability are not likely to yield quick 
results. Indeed, some of the issues of poor transparency and accountability are 
themselves the results of deeper problems. Again, pragmatic steps can weaken some 
of these constraints and political leaderships need to start working in earnest to 
identify the points of entry and to work intensely at these points. Business as usual is 
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not working. In particular, many of the problems that we face arise from a huge 
discrepancy between the cost of producing power, which partly depends on the high 
costs of financing these huge investments, and the effectively subsidized price at 
which the PDB is bound to sell power given the purchasing power of the retail 
customer and the need to accelerate small and medium industrial investments. The 
result is an increasing financial deficit that is facing PDB, and the fear that this may 
not be sustainable further raises the risk premium that is added to the cost of financing 
investments in this sector. The result can be a particularly unfortunate vicious cycle 
where the risk premium raises the cost of generating power, and the higher cost of 
additional power further strains PDB finances, further raising the risk premium for 
subsequent projects.  
 
Let us begin with a specific feature of the power generation sector in Bangladesh that 
sets it apart from many other developing countries. The share of the private sector in 
electricity generation is already high (relative to our neighbours), and current plans 
are to significantly increase this share. By 2010 the private sector generated 38% of 
electricity in Bangladesh. In comparison, in 2008-09 the private sector in India 
generated less than 15% of India’s electricity. The Government of Bangladesh elected 
in 2008 announced in its ‘New Initiative’ plans to attract an additional USD 9 billion 
of investment in power generation by 2015, of which USD 8 billion is expected from 
the private sector. If private investment on this scale were achieved, this would raise 
the share of the private sector in power generation in Bangladesh to around 65% of 
total generation capacity according to government figures. Thus, the plan aims for a 
significantly higher share of private investment in generation compared to India even 
though the latter is much more advanced in terms of international interest in its 
infrastructure sector. But I believe private investment on this scale is very unlikely to 
be forthcoming given the risk characteristics of this sector unless governments take 
specific steps to address some critical issues.  
 
Possibly the most important critical issue here is the implication of such an expanded 
role for the private sector for the risk premium facing private investments. Power 
plants with the capacity to generate a few hundred megawatts involve significant 
investments upwards of several hundred million dollars with plant lifetimes of well 
over a decade. Private sector investors investing in these projects aim to sell 
electricity to the government which typically has to buy the power at a higher price 
than it is feasible to sell to final consumers. The difference appears as a deficit in the 
PDB’s accounts which is ultimately met by transfers from the central budget. The 
private producer’s contract with the government is for the cost of power generation 
net of the input cost of fossil fuels. Holding the fossil fuel price constant, the subsidy 
to private producers is higher the higher the private generation cost and the total 
subsidy grows with the total volume of electricity purchased. Unfortunately, the 
generation cost is not independent of the total subsidy that the government has to 
finance, because as the total subsidy increases the risk of PDB insolvency increases. 
This raises the risk premium for private financiers and thereby raises the cost of 
generation. While contracts with a government may appear ‘watertight’ on paper, the 
underlying risk of a future default cannot be adequately insured against and there is 
therefore a non-negligible risk of government default or (more plausibly) a 
renegotiation of contracts in the future. This results in an implicit risk premium in 
raising finance for these investments. Unless the government is very careful in 
controlling the cost of finance and the risk premium, investment in the power sector 
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can suffer from a vicious cycle of causation that can slow down or even preclude 
significant productive investments.  
 
High financing costs have a number of important effects for investments in this sector. 
Indeed, the cascading and possibly self-fulfilling effects of high risk premiums partly 
explain why the public sector or at least public financing has historically played an 
important role in the power sector in developing countries. Both the public sector and 
state-assisted financing for the private sector continue to play this role in India despite 
the significant opening up that has happened in that country. The market failures that 
prevent full contracting mean that the public financing of power sector projects may 
be more efficient even though power is not a pure public good. In particular, in very 
poor countries, private risk perceptions and risk premiums may make the price of 
private power generation considerably higher than would otherwise have been the 
case. To accommodate this, the levels of government subsidy required may rise 
significantly and be ultimately unsustainable. Already by FY2009, the monthly 
subsidy to PDB had been formalized at 500 million taka and will grow probably five-
fold if the projected private sector investments come through. Not only is this likely to 
be unsustainable, but these figures are based on current production costs being 
sustained. In fact, the increasing risk premium as the market adjusts to successive 
increases in subsidy is likely to result in higher costs of production for successive 
plants and therefore a higher required subsidy.  
 
This characteristic of power generation financing can help to explain a striking feature 
of bidding for private power generation contracts in Bangladesh. These tenders 
generally attract very limited global interest and usually a very small number of 
players with close relationships with government remain at the final stages of bidding 
for significant power generation projects. Typically, the limited number of bidders is 
taken as evidence of limited transparency and the high costs and uncertainties of 
bidding. This is partially true. But given the high levels of risk that cannot be 
effectively contracted against, it is not surprising that only firms that have already 
invested heavily in relationships with individuals in positions of power are likely to 
risk proceeding to the final stages of the bidding process.  
 
The private investor knows that whatever the contract says, in potentially adverse 
future conditions the contract may be difficult to enforce and there are many unknown 
and therefore non-contracted risks that can also affect the overall viability of the 
investment. As a result, it is rational for firms to invest in ‘relationships’ with 
government to mitigate these risks by keeping open preferential and personalized 
channels of negotiation that allow ongoing informal contracting. In case of future 
difficulties with payments or access to fuel, investors know that contacts and informal 
bargaining are more likely to be important than contracts and formal processes of 
redress. Given the high cost or even implausibility of enforcement through the formal 
legal system, firms are more likely to be able to negotiate any required changes on an 
ongoing basis, or to ensure that they will be higher up the chain of claims in case of 
financial difficulties if they can call on long-term relationships with politicians and 
bureaucrats in critical positions. This is not a sufficient guarantee because politicians 
and bureaucrats will certainly not remain in place for the lifetime of a power project, 
but it is unlikely that firms will even begin to engage in this sector in the absence of 
these relationships.  
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Just as important, close links to government can give bidders who are close to the 
government access to low cost government financing through the back door by 
enabling them to organize part of their financing from public banks, institutions and 
funds. However, these conditions may later be interpreted as collusion and corruption 
that further increases the risk for investors because contracts are likely to be re-
examined by subsequent governments if new relationships with the subsequent 
government are not rapidly established. And while there are ‘legitimate’ reasons why 
only firms and individuals with established relationships with government and 
bureaucracy will bid for projects, these conditions also enable damaging collusion. 
For instance, technical specifications can be set to privilege suppliers associated with 
particular insiders. Ironically, even if a firm resists capturing additional advantage 
using its relationships, it is very difficult to signal to the general public or to 
subsequent governments that they did not seek special privileges. Firms therefore 
have every incentive to seek privileges and have money on tap to make deals with 
politicians. This argument is not intended to excuse the corruption and collusion of 
participants in power sector projects, but to demonstrate that this type of corruption is 
unlikely to be addressed using standard anti-corruption tools such as greater 
transparency in the award of contracts. The personalized relationships here are not the 
result of limited transparency. Rather the limited transparency is a result of the 
relationships that are required to sustain investments in a context of risks that cannot 
be contractually limited.  
 
The problem is if investors know that the only way they can bid at a reasonable price 
is if they are close to the government, they also know that subsequent governments 
may take an adverse view of their business. Under these circumstances, there is 
unfortunately a strong incentive to make money quickly rather than to risk being 
exposed to future challenges by a subsequent government. These features of the 
power sector can explain some specific characteristics of the power sector in 
Bangladesh. Irregularities in the power sector are a characteristic of every developing 
country, but in Bangladesh rent capture happens mostly at the procurement stage as 
opposed to the production or distribution stage. Procurement irregularities have 
resulted in persistent problems with external funders like the World Bank about 
appropriate procedures and transparency. Rent capture at the procurement stage often 
also means that technical specifications are tailored to ensure that bidders preferred by 
particular insiders are favoured, or specifications are deliberately set to be very 
demanding to raise prices of outsider bidders while insiders can expect lax monitoring 
of specifications. This suggests that in Bangladesh even firms with significant 
relationships with government do not wait for long-run profits based on power 
generation and are more likely to seek to capture significant rents at the procurement 
stage. 
 
It makes a lot of difference whether private sector firms seek to make high profits at 
the procurement stage by overstating the price and quality of the capital equipment or 
at the production and distribution stage, for instance by influencing the price at which 
power is purchased. The former creates significant upfront rents at the very inception 
of the project, while the latter can create a stream of somewhat more modest rents but 
throughout the lifetime of the project. The latter may add up to be significantly higher 
in aggregate, but if investors doubt the future solvency of the government as the 
purchaser of electricity, they have strong incentives to make as much money in the 
procurement and installation stage of the project. The rational investor, particularly 
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the local sponsor who may be more aware of local political economy, is therefore 
likely to want to make as much of their return as possible upfront and rely less on the 
stream of future incomes for guaranteeing an overall return on investment. This could 
explain the strong preference in Bangladesh for maximizing ‘procurement rents’ as 
opposed to rents on production and distribution. The rents that investors seek have 
implications for the likely outcomes. A focus on procurement rents has particularly 
adverse implications for the quality of projects and the real cost of generating power.  
 
When we look at these interrelated factors, it is not surprising that there have been 
remarkably few major successes in private power projects so far. In fact, there have 
been no significant private investments in power generation since the Haripur and 
Meghnaghat investments that became operational in 2001 and 2002 respectively. In 
both these cases, the cost of capital was significantly reduced as a result of financing 
by international development finance institutions. In the case of Meghnaghat 
financing was provided through IDCOL (the Infrastructure Development Co. Ltd.) a 
bespoke financing company that received significant funding from the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, and indirectly in the case of Haripur through the 
provision of a Partial Risk Guarantee by the World Bank. The financial viability of 
these projects and the credibility of the government’s power purchase agreements 
meant that effective procurement processes could be enforced in both cases. In both 
cases the cost of power generation was relatively low, and comparable to the average 
public sector generation costs. The success or otherwise of the New Initiative of the 
Awami League government depends on whether the half a dozen or so power sector 
project contracts that were awarded by 2011 to a single private sector company 
(Summit Group) can actually be delivered given the financing and credibility 
problems discussed earlier.  
 
The longer term challenge for Bangladesh is to multiply power projects on this scale 
every few years, and that requires attention to the longer term issues, regardless of 
what happens to the Summit contracts. Common policy responses to the slow pace of 
investments in the power sector have usually focused on fixing characteristics that 
diverge from the ‘good governance’ and competitive market models. For instance, 
development agencies including the World Bank have insisted on transparent 
procurement guidelines and bidding procedures. However, these reform efforts have 
not yielded significant results. This is partly because our analysis suggests that many 
of the characteristics that are targeted are themselves the outcomes of deeper causes. 
For instance, the existence of a small number of bidders and evidence of irregularities 
at the procurement phase may appear to be the result of poor procurement and bidding 
procedures but may actually be manifestations of deeper problems associated with 
high risk premiums and contracting costs in contexts of structural uncertainty. Given 
this general context, it is not surprising that rule-following procurement and bidding 
processes have not emerged nor have political parties become more accountable to the 
extent that they are able to make transparent decisions in the public interest.  
 
This analysis suggests that a more pragmatic way of breaking some of these 
constraints would be to ask if the credibility of a flow of power sector projects can be 
increased. Here, there are some interesting comparisons we can make with the Indian 
experience. By ensuring a public sector flow of funds that could finance a significant 
stream of power projects, the logjam over contract awards and the focus on 
procurement rents was avoided. This does not mean there is no rent capture in the 
26 
 
Indian power generation sector: there is, and it is significant. But by changing just one 
of the independent variables, India achieved significantly greater power generation 
per capita compared to Bangladesh. A few facts here will put the problem in 
Bangladesh in perspective. In 2007 India’s per capita consumption of electricity was 
714 KWh compared to 155 KWh in Bangladesh (World Development Indicators 
2010). India’s current installed capacity is 143 GW but it too suffers from a serious 
power deficit and Indian policy-makers believe that to sustain its economic growth it 
has to add another 100 GW of capacity by 2012 (Altaf 2009). This is not only a 
challenging prospect but also suggests that given India’s own power deficit, 
Bangladesh cannot solve its electricity demand to any significant degree through 
cross-border purchases. The important comparison with India is that the political 
economy of the power sector is somewhat different for a number of reasons that are 
relevant for understanding policy constraints in Bangladesh.  
 
Unlike Bangladesh, the major leakage of rents in the Indian power sector takes place 
at the transmission and distribution (T&D) stage through the State Electricity Boards 
(SEBs) in each state. Unaccounted-for electricity (mainly due to theft or non-
payment, but also some technical losses) amounts to an astounding 30 per cent of total 
supply, equivalent to almost USD 9.6 billion in 2010 according to GOI figures. These 
losses are projected to grow further to almost USD 14.5 billion in 2011. The 
likelihood of a possible future default in payments to power generators is therefore 
similar to Bangladesh and may have resulted in a similar vicious cycle of high risk 
premiums, high generation costs and shrinking time horizons resulting in a scramble 
for procurement rents if projects had to raise finance in private capital markets with 
high risk premiums added on.  
 
Instead, while India’s power sector clearly has a different set of problems it was able 
to add on significant amounts of generation capacity over the last three decades. The 
main factor that can at least partially explain this is the way in which power 
generation projects were financed in India. This financing has come partly from fiscal 
resources but also through a number of financial institutions, in particular the Power 
Finance Corporation (PFC), set up in 1986. The PFC is particularly interesting as it 
was set up as a special purpose development bank for power utilities. The government 
initially capitalized it with equity and tax free bonds. The timing of its creation was 
serendipitous. Within a few years the Indian capital markets had matured enough to 
develop an appetite for infrastructure bonds. In 1997 PFC underwent securitization 
and emerged with its balance sheet healthier. In 2007 the government of India 
divested close to ten per cent of its holdings in the company in one of the most 
successful initial public offerings by a PSE. 
  
The PFC is the main provider of funds for investments in generation and does this 
through term and bridge loans, supplier’s credit, debt refinancing and lease finance 
among other methods. It provides the public sector with up to 80 per cent loan 
coverage for generation projects and up to 50 per cent for private sector projects. The 
ability of the PFC to access public finances and borrow at credit ratings available for 
Indian sovereign debt significantly reduced the cost of capital in the Indian power 
generation sector. For instance, currently India’s prime lending rate is 12.25% and 
most PFC loans are cheaper: between 10.75% for highly rated states and AAA rated 
companies to 12.25% for some non-rated private sector borrowers. The reduction in 
the cost of capital is significant. As a public sector financial institution, the PFC does 
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not need to add a risk premium when it is effectively relying on purchase contracts 
signed by the Indian state to recover its money.  
  
The governance structure of the PFC cannot be replicated in Bangladesh because the 
PFC benefits from the checks and balances provided by India’s federal structure. As a 
central government financial organization, the PFC is answerable to the central 
government, while most power generation projects that it finances come under state 
governments. This structure enables PFC to resist state politicians’ attempts to 
influence the allocation of financing to their friends. This, together with strong 
professional bureaucratic leadership has ensured that PFC financing does not get 
captured by inefficient projects where the prime interest is procurement rents. In the 
context of a smaller country like Bangladesh, more attention would have to be given 
to the governance of a similar financial organization to ensure that credit allocation 
was not going to be captured by clients of the ruling party. On the other hand, 
Bangladesh has the advantage that the private sector is already a significant player in 
power generation. In Bangladesh, potential financing for power generation at 
manageable interest rates could be made available to winning private sector bids if the 
bidder satisfied technical qualifications. If bidders knew that partial financing would 
be available from a financial institution at an interest rate that did not have a high risk 
premium, this would create strong incentives for serious bidders to enter bidding and 
submit themselves to greater transparency. A focus on developing governance 
structures for financing power generation at preferential rates in Bangladesh is 
therefore likely to be a fruitful point of entry for cracking some of the political 
economy constraints facing investments in this vital sector.  
 
Clearly, the availability of such a facility would have to be combined with dedicated 
governance arrangements to ensure that the financing available would only be 
available for projects that satisfied technical and other governance criteria. The 
IDCOL experience in Bangladesh suggests that this may be achievable. This may 
appear to be an optimistic expectation, but in fact procurement procedures were much 
better for Meghnaghat compared to some other cases. This is not surprising because if 
financing is available at a price that makes power projects credible, financial 
institutions have credible leverage for insisting on better procurement conditions. 
Secondly, with better procurement conditions and weaker incentives for fixing 
technical specifications, the adverse selection that results in serious bidders dropping 
out is less likely to happen. Thirdly, if upfront rents are less in evidence, the intensity 
of inner-party and bureaucratic lobbying can be expected to decrease, with the focus 
of interested parties shifting to a greater extent to the long-term rents from the 
production and distribution of power. This may not be less corrupt (as the Indian 
experience shows) but will enable a much greater flow of power projects to come on 
stream, which is what the country needs. None of these potentially beneficial results 
are likely to automatically follow without considerable attention being given to the 
governance design of any facility of this type in the future. But our analysis suggests 
that without a substantial facility which can promise to reduce the cost of financing 
and contribute to improving the viability of investments in the power generation 
sector, interventions that simply target some of the adverse characteristics of this 
sector are likely to fail. 
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6. Conclusions  
My intention was to identify some major areas of policy challenges in Bangladesh and 
to suggest that there are pragmatic and do-able ways of beginning to think about 
policy responses to these problems. I do not wish to suggest that the kinds of ideas 
discussed here would be sufficient to solve the multi-dimensional problems facing 
different sectors and issues in Bangladesh. But I do believe that long lists of problems 
and multi-dimensional solutions are a bad way of thinking about what policy-makers 
can do. It is much more realistic given the limited reform capabilities in any country 
to think through to the most likely area where a change could make the greatest 
difference to the outcomes. A pragmatic approach to institutional and policy reform 
should begin with a small list of things to do which may be difficult but are 
potentially do-able if significant effort and political leadership was put into it. 
Remember the big impact that back-to-back LCs and bonded warehouses made to the 
garment industry.  
 
There is another important policy message in the methodology adopted in this paper. 
The strategy of changing a significant part of the policy and institutional environment 
in a developing country at one go (as is implicit in the good governance and big bang 
liberalization attempts) is fundamentally misleading. But equally, the idea that 
governance does not matter and we can muddle through and somehow ‘manage’ is 
also seriously problematic as our economy becomes bigger and more complex and 
demanding. The intermediate position which is most realistic is that we cannot fix 
everything at the same time but we can and should try to identify and focus on a small 
number of institutions and agencies that we try to make effective. They will not 
necessarily work perfectly and fully transparently and without any corruption. But if 
we can put first class professionals in charge of a small number of critical ‘nation-
building institutions’ and we are lucky to find public-spirited leaders for these 
agencies, and if political support from the highest political leadership is unequivocal 
and if we succeed in building the public support for these agencies, much can be 
achieved. The history of development success is based on the incremental building of 
such agencies and institutions.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Key Features of Bangladesh Economy 2000- 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP growth (annual %) 5.9 5.3 4.4 5.3 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.9
GDP per capita growth 
(%) 4.0 3.4 2.6 3.5 4.5 4.3 5.0 4.9 4.7
Agriculture growth rate 7.4 3.1 0.0 3.1 4.1 2.2 4.9 4.6 3.2
Agriculture share in 
GDP 25.5 24.1 22.7 21.8 21.0 20.1 19.6 19.2 19.0
% Employed in 
agriculture 62.1 51.7 48.1
Food Production Index 102.0 100.0 103.0 106.0 104.0 117.0 118.0 117.0
Industry growth rate 6.2 7.4 6.5 7.3 7.6 8.3 9.7 8.4 6.8
Manufacturing growth 
rate 4.8 6.7 5.5 6.7 7.1 8.2 10.8 9.7 7.2
Industry share in GDP 25.3 25.9 26.4 26.3 26.6 27.2 27.9 28.4 28.5
Manufacturing share in 
GDP 15.2 15.6 15.9 15.8 16.1 16.5 17.2 17.8 17.8
% Employed in industry 10.3 13.7 14.5
Services growth rate 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.7 6.4 6.4 6.9 6.5
Services share in GDP 49.2 50.0 50.9 52.0 52.4 52.6 52.5 52.4 52.5
% Employed in services 23.5 34.6 37.4
Gross domestic savings 
(% of GDP) 17.8 17.0 18.4 17.6 18.7 18.1 18.4 17.5 15.8
Gross fixed capital 
formation (% of GDP) 23.0 23.1 23.1 23.4 24.0 24.5 24.7 24.5 24.2 24.2 24.6  
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators 2010, Asian Development 
Bank. 2010 figures are estimates. Some cells are empty because data are not yet 
available.  
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